For years, SoftSwiss has marketed itself as a neutral iGaming technology provider – just a platform, just software, just infrastructure. But mounting evidence from regulatory actions, whistleblower disclosures, and investigative reporting suggests that SoftSwiss may be operating as something far more consequential: a central enabler in a global offshore gambling and payment laundering ecosystem.
At the heart of this system is SoftSwiss’s ability to integrate platform, affiliate management (Affilka), and payment orchestration into a single operational spine. This combination—while commercially attractive—has proven uniquely suited to operators seeking to mask beneficial ownership, rotate legal entities, and evade national regulators.
Recent findings linked to the RevDuck affiliate network illustrate the mechanics of this model. Brands such as Holyluck, Trueluck, and Kokobet appear to operate through rotating Costa Rican shell companies, changing corporate identities by geo-location while maintaining the same underlying casino infrastructure. The technology enabling this continuity, according to whistleblower submissions, is SoftSwiss tooling.
This is not an isolated pattern.
Dutch regulator Kansspelautoriteit (KSA) imposed a penalty order of up to €840,000 against the operator behind Booms.bet, identifying a Costa Rican SRL as the responsible entity. The same registration number—3-102-903325 (Sapphire Summit SRL)—later surfaced in Trueluck Casino materials. Different brand, same legal shell, same infrastructure.
Such overlaps raise unavoidable questions:
How do multiple “independent” operators repeatedly converge on the same legal entities, platforms, and payment paths?
And why do these structures only collapse once regulators or journalists connect the dots?
The evidence suggests centrality.
